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I
be given some credit for stimulating
the study of contractors' bidding practices made by Professor
Schultz. The study is an excellent example of what can be done
with modest resources and an indication of how much could be done
with greater means.
It is true that the investigation made by Mr. Schultz does not lead to
simple and indisputable conclusions. It is a study partly of practices, and
here it meets the test of care and accuracy. It involves also an examination of attitudes or judgments. Here, however much the judgments of
members of a trade may need careful attention by courts, it is always
possible that in some respects their judgments represent limited or biased
points of view which must be discounted. There is not much indication
that the judgments reported here need correction for such reasons;
though Mr. Schultz gives us an appropriate warning about the interests
of owners which might benefit from unlimited shopping around among
bidders by contractors.
Another difficulty with objective studies of commercial practices appears in Mr. Schultz's paper in interesting form. It would probably not be
entirely clear to a layman why the tabulation of responses leads to the
conclusions stated at the end of the paper. There is, so it seems, a sufficient body of opinion supporting the view that a bid ought not to be withdrawn on account of a rise in prices, at least if the contractor to whom it
has been submitted will be worse off than he would have been had the bid
not been submitted at all. The opinions reported seem, indeed, to go
further, and to indicate a judgment on the part of both bidders and contractors that a bid ought not to be withdrawn under any circumstances
because of a rise in prices, at least if the contractor has in turn made his
bid. So far as appears, it may be a general respect for this judgment, and
practice in conformity with it, which makes contractors somewhat unconcerned about the problem of the cases which have puzzled lawyers
and courts. Nevertheless, the author concludes that his study tends to
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results unfavorable to the judgment that a firm offer should, under some
circumstances at least, be enforceable without regard to its acceptance.
The principal bases of the author's conclusion seem to be the responses
which indicate an opinion that a bidder is not bound, by trade standards,
unless the contractor is under obligation to him; and those which indicate
that a contractor to whom a bid has been submitted is not himself bound,
by trade standards, to award the job to any bidder until the contractor
has accepted a bid. There seems to be considerable opinion the other way,
especially on the first point. On the second point, a number of responses
treat the contractor as bound to accept the bid which he has used in making his bid, perhaps on grounds somewhat analagous to those which explain the obligations arising out of the conduct of an auction "without
reserve." There is an interesting difference of opinion about the obligations
of the contractor; but we may accept for purposes of argument the author's conclusion that the favorable opinion does not seem general enough
to support a recognition of the contractor's obligation before acceptance,
if the question were presented, with our present knowledge, to a court.
It is however quite a different question whether the bidder who has submitted his bid to the contractor may be bound although the contractor
is not. The author's conclusion that opinion does not support the view that
the bidder is or should be bound depends in the end primarily on the opinion that the contractor is not or should not himself be bound. But the
conclusion does not by any means follow from the premise.
It must be said that eminent students of the common law would apparently accept the argument made by Mr. Schultz and supported by
some of his responses. Mr. Llewellyn in one of his articles uses a similar
argument in dealing with a problem arising out of time intervals in correspondence. He is nevertheless a draftsman of the firm offer article of
the Uniform Commercial Code, which the present study leads Mr.
Schultz to question.
Dealing with the civil-law rule which permits an offeree effectively to
reject by a letter dispatched later, but received by the offeror earlier,
than a letter of acceptance, Mr. Llewellyn seems to rest his criticism of
that rule principally on the following ground: "To fail to close the deal
as against the offeree until the letter of agreement arrives is to extend
[an] unbalanced risk of the market without observable reason.",,When the
I Our Case Law of Contract, Offer and Acceptance, I1, 48 Yale L.J. 779, 795 n. 23 (i939).
See also i Corbin, Contracts §§ 78, 8o (rg5o). The discussion of various matters in the present
comment is illustrated more fully in Kessler and Sharp, Cases on Contract (Mimeographed,
rev. ed., 1951) which is to be regularly published during the year.
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Court of Claims recently permitted an offeree thus effectively to anticipate the arrival of his letter of acceptance,2 a variety of opinions were expressed in the law reviews.3 It was indeed curious to observe how the decision of such a narrow question occasioned comments reflecting manners
of thought so characteristic of the different schools. The comment of our
review, 4 though the board does not by any means always follow the
faculty,/5 reflected in this instance an opinion favorable to the result of the
case, which has long been held by the author of the present comment.
Mr. Llewellyn would presumably disagree. Is his position on this point
consistent with his draft of the firm offer section of the commercial code?
It is hard for the reviewer to reconcile the positions, at least if the argument proceeds from the treacherous but familiar use of analogy to an
examination of the unfamiliar but real premises of decisions, the premises
of policy.
For if one asks why it should be a fatal objection to an obligation on the
part of an offeror, to say that the offeree is not bound, he will in the end
find himself facing policy questions. An offeror has, on the assumptions
with which we must approach the problem, made a promise. In our
troublesome case the promise further implies in fact an undertaking that
it shall be unrevoked for some reasonable period. In the case of the subcontractor's bid, the implication that the offer shall remain unrevoked
for a reasonable time appears in the opinions of bidders and contractors
alike that it is not fair for the bidder to withdraw, at least after the contractor himself has bid, until the contractor has had a reasonable time
to close with the bidder. In the case of the contract by correspondence,
the rule that the offer is irrevocable after the dispatch of the letter of acceptance must depend, so far as it is rational at all, on the view that the
offer contains not only a promise of performance conditional on acceptance, but an undertaking against revocation, effective at any rate upon
the dispatch of the letter of acceptance.
On principle, in the absence of some indication in the offer about a
time limit for lapse, the offer should be irrevocable only until the lapse of
2 Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl., 1949). See 3 Corbin, Contracts § 6og n. 47
(195o), justifying the result on the grounds of the offeree's mistake in his acceptance and the

substitution of a new contract.
3 See for example the notes in 44 Ill. L. Rev. 394, 397 (1949); 62 Harv. L. Rev. 1231, 1232
(1949); 59 Yale L.J. 374, 376, 378 (I95o); 25 Ind. L.J. 202 (1950); 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 375,
378 (195o).

4 Acceptance and Rejection in Contracts by Correspondence, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 375
(195o).
s See, e.g., The Parol Evidence Rule: A Conservative View, p. 348 infra.
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a reasonable time for receipt of a reply. By a curious aberration, which
must not distract us from the main theme of our discussion, the common
law, and some European codes as well have put the entire risk of delay or
loss on the offeror. Where the offeree has acted in reliance on the offer, and
his "acceptance" has been lost or unreasonably delayed in the mails, as in
a great range of comparable cases, the business-like solution of restitution
with division of reliance losses seems more consistent with our working
ideas of responsibility and property.6
For the present, that is not our main concern. We are concerned with a
recognition, by trade opinion or by law, that an offer should under some
circumstances, by reason of a term implied in fact, be irrevocable for some
specified period whether or not beginning with the time when the offer is
received and thus becomes a communication. The judgment expressed
here depends in the end on that great comiplex of evaluations, psychological, moral, commercial, political, ideological, which is both a cause and an
effect of the importance of the business undertaking in our society and
our civilization. We are dealing next with the argument that it is unfair or
somehow contrary to principle, or inconsistent with the nature of things,
to treat an undertaking against revocation as binding in morals, commercial judgment or law, in the absence of acceptance by the offeree.
The second point, once it is stated, hardly needs to be refuted. It is, at
least in its simple form, an outbreak of an uncritical notion of equality
of a sort which at times for a while confuses the law. Another famous
example affecting contract law was Lord Justice Fry's doctrine of "mu7
tuality" as a limit on specific performance.
Equality is one of the two or three indispensable working notions of
the law. For that very reason, it requires careful use. It does not require
that people be treated identically, if there is a practical reason, of a sort
with which courts are qualified to deal, for distinguishing them. The difference between an offeror who has made a promise to keep his offer
open and an offeree who has made no promise at all hardly needs to be
labored. The contractor to whom a bid is submitted, if by its terms it
imports an undertaking against revocation, may reasonably depend both
in his thinking and in his bidding on the assurance which is the mark of
an undertaking. There would be no violation of any simple working idea
of equality, if the bidder who has made a promise were treated quite differently from the contractor who has made none.
6See Loss Splitting in Contract Litigation, i8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 153 (i95o).
7See Limitations on the Availability of Specific Performance, 17 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 409
415-17, 419 (195o).
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So in the specified situation presented by the contract by correspondence, it is not surprising to find that the law has bound the offeror, for a
time at least, on the dispatch of the offeree's letter of acceptance. The letter
of acceptance lying in the mail box cannot however by any stretch of language be regarded as a promise. A promise, as the word is used by laymen
and lawyers alike, imports some assurance to the promisee. A letter in a
mail box cannot possibly give any such assurance. The offeror is bound,
and some have jumped to the conclusion that this can be so only if the
offeree is also bound. As the cases have begun to present dearly the problem of the offeree's obligation, it has seemed to the courts, as the writer
understands them, that there was no justification for holding the offeree
simply because his letter has been mailed. Ifis letter in the course of transmission can have given no assurance to the offeror, and can have made no
difference to him either psychologically or commercially. If after the dispatch of the letter of acceptance the offeree wires "disregard my letter;
I reject," it cannot cause the offeror any significant disappointment or inconvenience to give effect to the communicated rejection, if he has not
then received the letter containing the notations of acceptance. If the
offeree retains the privilege of rejection by a communication anticipating
the arrival of his letter of acceptance, basic notions of equality do not in
turn require that the offeror's obligation not to revoke should be reexamined.
II
It may be that a somewhat less fundamental notion is a justification or
explanation of the strong feeling which expresses itself in Mr. Llewellyn's
remarks on the contract by correspondence, in some of the law review
notes on the recent decision of the Court of Claims, and in Mr. Schultz's
conclusions about the obligations of bidders. There appears to be a feeling
that undertakings for which no return is made ought not to be enforced.
Both the continental European law and the English law enlarged very
cautiously the classification of promises enforceable in court. In the
Roman and continental law, the limitations on the enforcement of promises which may be explained as dependent on the feeling for "exchange"
have been almost entirely superseded. The controlling principle of the
continental European law is that deliberate words of pr6mise should be
enforced according to their terms; subject to precautions designed primarily to assure deliberation and to give effect to familiar policies about
duress, fraud, mistake, changing conditions, and the relationships between contract and other bases of liability. The doctrines of Cc6iiieration,
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which are partly a vestigial result of the evolution and crystallization of
ideas, and partly a result of the peculiar history of the jurisdiction of the
common-law courts, may be developing in the same direction.
The notion of harm that plays so important a part in the evolution of
the action of assumpsit has appeared again as a source of growth in the
developing doctrine that promises will be enforced, whether by the allowance of reliance damages or by the allowance of expectation damages,
where the promise has occasioned reasonable reliance in the conduct of the
promisee's affairs. The evolution of this notion received its most striking
check under the influence of a countervailing notion that promises should
not be enforced unless some price had been paid for them in exchange.
This countervailing notion was announced by Chancellor Kent and
strengthened by Langdell, though-unlike Kent-Langdell recognized
its unhistorical character. Certainly everything that Mr. Llewellyn or
Mr. Schultz says or implies about the notion of exchange should be taken
subject to the limitation that a promise should be enforced, at least to the
extent of reliance damages, if it has occasioned reasonable reliance in conduct as distinct from simple psychological reliance 8
This notion of exchange, of that reciprocity which Malinowski has
studied at work among the Trobriand Islanders, 9 is itself capable of expanding the classification of enforceable promises. Thus promises in return
for past benefits are on the way to develop a more general principle than
any which the common law has as yet recognized.I ° To say that some
element of benefit to the promisor is necessary for the enforcement of his
promise is, however, quite different.
Promises to make gifts may for a variety of reasons, some of them connected with our notions of property, require special safeguards of form.
It seems to the writer, moreover, that there is much more sense than it is
fashionable to recognize in the doctrines of the common law making
promises ineffectual when they are given in exchange for less than the
amount of an admittedly due debt, or when they are made to gain the performance of an admitted obligation, or when they occur by way of pretended compromise of merely specious claims or defenses. Here ques8See

the author's Pacta Sunt Servanda, 41 Col. L. Rev. 783, 791 (1941).

9See Malinowski, Crime and Custom in Savage Society, 17-32 (1926); and compare
Llewellyn and Hoebel, The Cheyenne Way, 266-67 (1941).
10As to sureties' undertakings, see Sharp, op. cit. supra note 8, at 794; Hays, Consideration:
A Legislative Program, 41 Col. L. Rev. 849,858-59 (194). Cf. Webb v. McGowin, 27 Ala. App.
82, i68 So. i96 (i935), cert. denied, 232 Ala. 374, i68 So. i99 (1936). For an interesting interaction between notions of past consideration and "value," consider Elgin Nat'I Bank v.
Goecke, 295 Ill. 403, 129 N.E. 149 (1920).
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tions of duress as well as exchange are present and a modern form seems
needed for protection."*
When an offer, for example one which falls just short of turning into a
requirement contract, may be read as containing by implication an undertaking that it will be kept open for a long time, for example, a year, the
author confesses that a feeling probably involving reciprocity leads him
to the conclusion that it should not be enforced according to its terms.
Here an element of sense in the feeling of reciprocity as a limiting factor
seems to appear. If however a modem form were used, such as the words
"I intend to be legally bound not to revoke this offer for one year,"
the author would find that his sense of fairness was adequately served
and that the undertaking should be enforceable according to its terms.
It may be therefore that those other functions of form and consideration
are what affect the author's judgment. These are the functions of marking
off the promise, requiring somewhat elaborate proofs, and assuring deliberation on the part of the promisor.
The different set of notions, that reciprocity should be observed, that
there should be some minimum fairness of exchange, that some premium
should be required for taking risks or underwriting uncertainties, these
notions have indeed vitality. They may reflect subtle psychological impulses and insights: the impulse to limit severity, the impulse to think in
traders' patterns, the impulse to respect-as magic entities-any patterns
once created in the law.
These notions must however be carefully guarded if they are not to mislead us in dealing with the rather limited problem of contracts by correspondence and the somewhat larger problem of offers which "expressly"
or by the reasonable implication of words read in context, contain undertakings against revocation.
III
Each of the three cases which have raised in most interesting form the
questions which have thus far been discussed is complicated by the presence of mistake', In one case the offeror whose bid had been acted on discovered a mistake in his figures, and then revoked his offer. 12 In the second
case, a situation of the same sort was supposed as the basis for a wellconsidered dictum, qualified immediately by a questionable counter"x Compare, for example, i Page, Contracts §§ 593-94 (2d ed., i91g) (containing a careful
statement of the authorities) with i Corbin, Contracts §§ E76-83 (z95o); and consider the
characteristic facts in Havana Press Drill Co. v. Ashurst, 148 I1. i5 (1894).
12James Baird Co. v. Gimbel Bros., Inc., 64 F. 2d 344 (C.A. 2d, 1933).
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dictum.' 3 In the third case, a case of alleged contract by correspondence,
the offeree who anticipated the arrival of his letter of acceptance by a
4
communicated rejection did so because of a mistake in his acceptance.'
It is arguable that the element of mistake influenced the results in the
first and third cases. Each however rests on a statement of principle
which would apply as well if the attempted revocation in one case or rejection in the other had been based on changes in market prices.
The author is favorable to relief for mistake, and particularly to relief
for the "unilateral" mistake appearing in each of the cases, subject to
suitable equitable safeguards., 5 He would not support the decision in the
first case on this ground, because of the change of position resulting from
the sequence of bids in that case. He would if necessary reach the result
in the third case on grounds of mistake. He cannot support the counterdictum in the second case in its application of mistake doctrine. It seems
to him that the court gave too little effect to the circumstance that the
recipient of the first offer had in turn submitted an offer himself, which
had been accepted, and which, in spite of some evidence to the contrary,
he might have had more or less difficulty, commercial or legal, in withdrawing. It is interesting to consider the mistake problems suggested by
these three cases, but they do not seem to eliminate the opinions and decisions as authorities on the other points which have been discussed.
Professor Schultz may however be interested at some point in examining the opinions of contractors about the problem of so-called unilateral mistake which has produced more litigation than any other. This
is the problem of mistake, whether clerical or arithmetical, in computing
figures used in bidding. While it is arguable that a contractor should be
treated as "warranting" the accuracy of his figures in dealing with nonprofessionals, there is a difference of opinion on this matter. On the other
hand, in dealing with professionals, the contractor's error is very likely
to be "palpable" in that an alert professional should have noticed it, or
must be treated as though he had noticed it, and relief will often be
granted on this ground.
When action has been taken on the faith of bids, a corrective principle
based on change of position may appear, and relief may be denied. It
would be more consistent with the somewhat analogous principles of tort
liability to hold the mistaken contractor liable for reliance damages, for
" Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 1317 F. 2d 654, 66o-6i (C.A. 7th,

1941).

Dick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 326 (Ct. Cl., 1949).
is See 3 Corbin, Contracts §§ 598, 6o8-6o9 (i95o) for relevant parts of an excellent discussion of mistake.
'4
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example the difference between the next lowest bid, if it has been lost, and
the price which the owner eventually has to pay; and relieve him from expectation damages, the benefit of the bargain, the difference between his
mistaken bid and what the owner has to pay.
Deliberate chance-taking is arguably the only appropriate basis for the
expectation damages so familiar to the lawyer, the damages designed to
give the obligee the benefit of his bargain. The deliberate and unmistaken
promise, with all the range of gambles which it may deliberately underwrite, is the one which is most likely to work out well, humanly and commercially. Its benefit must be assured in any chance-taking economy, indeed in some form in any economy which we can imagine. The mistaken
promise, made with or without negligence, like a negligent tort, needs
only to give rise at most to a charge against the promisor to cover any
resulting loss leaving the promisee worse off than he was before the
promise.
Whether or not these distinctions, derived partly from the civil law,
may be worked into the patterns of the common law, it appears to the
writer that a reasonable use of mistake doctrine would lead us to the
solution of a good many problems which may otherwise be solved in
ways which may unnecessarily confuse the law. If the security of expectations is likely to be promoted, as the author thinks, by an increasing caution in the use of doctrines of acceptance, mutuality and consideration, it
seems equally likely that the security of transactions will be somewhat
less regarded, as time goes on, in situations where there is unilateral mistake of a character which would afford a basis for relief if it were mutual.
Judge Frank's opinion in Ricketts v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,6 approves a

decision relieving a dining car waiter from a personal injury release on the
grounds, first, that the release resulted from a unilateral mistake about its
contents, and second, it seems, on the ground that the waiter in giving the
release was a victim of "economic inequality." Judge Frank was kind
enough to cite the author in support of his conclusion, and the author is
indeed in complete agreement with what Judge Frank says on the first
point and on "objective theory" in general. It seems likely that the elements of good sense in traditional objective theory are being carefully
limited, with healthy results, by what may perhaps be appropriately
called an emerging "subjective theory."
Such a subjective theory may save us from trying to develop Judge
Frank's second point into a systematic theory of inequality of bargaining
z6 153 F. 2d

757 (C.A. 7th, 1946).
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power.' The concern for the subcontractor as the "weaker party" expressed by Mr. Schultz depends of course on a theory of "inequality"
in this third sense.
"Inequality of bargaining power" is likely to mean differences in wealth
or income. In a society based on differential returns, furnishing incentives
and means of self-expression, it is hard to see how differences in wealth or
income can be systematically developed as bases for judicial decisions., 8
Another meaning of inequality of bargaining power, intelligible in theory,
depends on the existence of "monopoly" or "monopsony" in the sense in
which such phenomena need to be proved for convictions under the
Sherman Act. While such a use of the terms is intelligible in theory, it
might in practice introduce into private litigation all of the elaborate
difficulties which appear in prolonged government prosecutions under the
antitrust laws.
It is of course in the field of insurance that rough practical notions
of the inequality of bargaining power have had their most striking effect.
So conservative a writer as Mr. Williston has suggested 9 that some of
the most startling results in the insurance cases can be explained as well
by principles governing relief for mistake as by the questionable notions
about bargaining power which appear so prominently in discussions of insurance and which seem indeed to have influenced the courts in arriving
at decisions. As the export shipper or ship owner was followed by the ordinary man getting his life insured, confusion of mind on the part of those
getting insurance appears to have increased in a way quite as significant
as the increasing spread between the resources of the insured and the resources of the insurance companies, not infrequently mutual companies
in the billion-dollar asset class. It may seem a small point, but it seems to
the writer worth-while to concentrate some attention on the confusions
rather than on differences in resources. We need in dealing with such
situations to recall the paradox in our social scheme, which values equality
but which insists also on freedom and differential returns. Relief for mistake is consistent with the assumptions of such a system; but relief on ac,7 Cf. Policing Contracts Under the Proposed Commercial Code, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 146
(1950).
is The difficulty is there even though a fairly good individualist like Bentham suggested, in
his Principles of the Civil Code, that some of the losses resulting from breach of contract should
be distributed "among the parties interested, in proportion to their property." i Works of
Jeremy Bentham (Bowring ed., 1843).
19

3 Contracts §§ 749-50 (rev. ed., 1936); cf. ibid., §§ 759-60.
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count of any disparity in resources permitted by the legislature seems
inconsistent with such a system.
The cases which we have used as a basis for discussing some of the problems raised by Professor Schultz's study, serve at once to remind us that
the security of undertakings is limited by a number of corrective principles, including principles governing relief for mistake, and to indicate
that along with the refinement of these principles another refinement is
taking place tending to enlarge the protection given to the security of
expectations. In the development of current and counter-current, increasing knowledge of both the practices and the judgments of businessmen will contribute its part. The judgments must be both welcomed and
criticized, and they seem likely to be of considerable help in the work of
the profession. Toward the development of our understanding of business
practices and judgments, Mr. Schultz has made a notable contribution.

